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Theodore Rosenof |
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| The legend of Louis Bean: political prophecy and the 1948 election | |
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Основные результаты этих исследований отражены в его четырех монографиях, последняя из которых: Rosenof, Theodore. Realignment: the theory that changed the way we think about American politics. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2003. Наше внимание привлекла историко-биографическая статья профессора Розенофа, в которой он рассмотрел творчество американского экономиста и статистика Луиса Бина. Работы Бина оказались в поле зрения журналистов, политологов, социологов и поллстеров в 1948 году, когда он верно предсказал победу на президентских выборах Гарри Трумена. В том году Джордж Гэллап, Арчибальд Кроссли и Элмо Роупер, успешно предсказывавшие итоги президентских избирательных кампаний 1936, 1940 и 1944 годов, ошиблись в своих прогнозах. В статье Розенофа, опубликованной в The Historian, Vol. 62 (Fall 1999), 63-78, приводятся основные этапы жизни Бина и анализируется суть его проностического метода. Ещё до ознакомления со статьей профессора Розенофа Фатехом Вергасовым была подготовлена хронология жизни Бина, а нами написана краткая статья о его жизни. Статья размещена с любезного разрешения профессора Теодора Розенофа. Louis Bean's life spanned nearly a century, and his public career encompassed the entire New Deal/Fair Deal era. A pioneer in the field of political analysis and forecasting, Bean became a legend in his own time in November 1948 as the sole "prophet" to have predicted President Harry Truman's stunning election victory over Republican nominee Thomas Dewey. The recent fiftieth anniversary of Truman's triumph marks a timely occasion to explore Bean's career and legend. Although Bean remained active in his field for another 25 years, he would never again enjoy the same level of prominence. After 1948, the nation's political climate changed in such a way as to render Bean's analytic methodology less useful. Whereas Bean had relied on economic swings as the basis for his analyses, in the early 1950s foreign policy factors, notably the Korean conflict, assumed greater importance. At the same time, new developments in the field of political analysis eclipsed Bean's influence. Ironically, the 1948 election that established his reputation as a prophet also marked the beginning of his decline as an analyst. 2 Louis Bean was born in Russian Lithuania in 1896 and came to the United States in 1906. His family settled in Laconia, New Hampshire, where his parents established a dry goods business. More interested in study than in business, Bean went from public schools to the University of Rochester, where his interests shifted from physical to social science. His college career interrupted by stateside military service during World War I, Bean subsequently received a bachelor's degree from Rochester, worked in labor management in the clothing industry, and earned a master's degree in business administration from Harvard.(1) 3 Bean's government service began in 1923 when he joined the Department of Agriculture's newly established Bureau of Agricultural Economics. In 1933 Bean became a member of Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace's inner circle of advisers. He served during World War II at the Board of Economic Warfare and then at the Bureau of the Budget, returning in the postwar period to the Department of Agriculture.(2) Bean's work was founded upon the use of statistical analysis as a basis for policy formulation. It was this quantitative approach, which Bean first applied to agricultural economics and subsequently carried over to political analysis, for which he was initially hailed and of which in retrospect he was most proud. This statistical methodology, along with his intellectual and policy contributions, made Bean one of the archetypal New Deal social scientists, along with others such as Mordecai Ezekiel, Isador Lubin, and Gardiner C. Means. Bean stressed the contribution of social science to public service and worked on policy pronouncements and publications for top government officials, especially Henry Wallace.(3) As an economic analyst, Bean utilized concepts that he later adapted to his study of politics. For example, he was very interested in business cycles and cognizant of secular (i.e., long-term) trends. He considered some economic developments anomalous, however, and was always careful to stress the uncertainty of future developments regardless of historical and statistical patterns.(4) 4 Bean's interest in quantitative political analysis dated to 1936. In a story he never tired of telling, Bean explained that he was captivated by a World Almanac compilation of state-by-state presidential election statistics since 1896 and discerned in them patterns that provoked further study. Secretary Wallace encouraged this initial spark.(5) Bean practiced what he termed the "art" of political analysis and forecasting, insisting that it was indeed an art and not a science. He began with the quantitative record, that is, the historical patterns discerned in state-by-state electoral statistics. He then adapted that statistical historical base to the peculiarities of each election and to public opinion as revealed by scientific polling. His art consisted in large part of judging the extent to which historical patterns prevailed and the extent to which they were altered by anomalies--unusual phenomena continuing over the course of a campaign--or immediate current events.(6) In assessing economic trends, Bean wrote in 1932, judgment was "vitally important in making forecasts" because the time had not come when reliable predictions could "be made simply through the application of empirical formulae" alone. The soundness of a statistically based forecast necessarily was related to a knowledge and critical examination of the context surrounding the quantitative data.(7) Bean hoped to do for political analysis and forecasting what was underway already in his original field of economics: combine a quantitative base of past trends with observation and analysis of current tendencies to reach considered conclusions as to likely outcomes. Applied to politics, his overall goals were to ascertain "the basic characteristics of American political behavior" and to quantify the "factors ... responsible for shifts in the balance between the major parties."(8) Bean's key analytical concept was that of "political cycles" or, as he sometimes preferred to call them, "political tides." Reviewing elections since the emergence of the Democratic-Republican rivalry in the 1850s, Bean discerned an irregular but definable alternation in patterns of partisan predominance. These cycles were recurrent, usually lasting about two decades; hence, Republican dominance during the Civil War and Reconstruction gave way to a Democratic resurgence beginning in the mid-1870s. The Republican revival after 1893 receded as Democratic advances culminated in the Wilson era beginning in 1912. The Republican tide that ran strong through the 1920s gave way to the New Deal tide after 1930. Each cycle had "high and low points" and "different rates of rise and fall."(9) Not surprisingly for an analyst whose study of political trends began in the depressed 1930s, Bean believed that economic upheaval primarily accounted for political change. Hence, in his view the depression of 1857 began the Democratic decline that preceded the great "social upheaval" of 1860. The depression of 1873 heralded Democratic resurgence, while the depression of 1893 knocked the Democrats from power. The panic of 1908 contributed to Democratic renewal, while the downturn of 1920 advanced the Republican tide; and depression and recession underlay the political trend since 1929.(10) 5 Bean's analysis bore similarities to historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr.'s contemporary cyclical theory, including roughly comparable durations of tides, although the latter's was geared more to ideological and policy shifts than to partisan change and to Bean was insufficiently quantitative. Other aspects of Bean's approach foreshadowed the secular concepts advanced in the 1950s by Samuel Lubell and V. O. Key Jr., which thereafter displaced cyclical notions as the basic theoretical undergirding of electoral study. Bean differentiated, for example, between minor tides and such major tides as those reflected in the elections of 1860, 1894, and 1932. He also held that along with cyclical tides there was a secular Democratic trend going back decades, due to increasing urbanization, that reflected Democratic strength in the big cities. In other words, he placed cyclical movements within the context of a rising secular Democratic curve.(11) In addition to economic tides, Bean posited the existence of anomalies--issues, events, and forces that worked apart from normal patterns, some of which ethnocultural students of political behavior later considered more basic than economic factors. Most obviously, Bean saw 1928--when the Democrats nominated the Catholic A1 Smith for president--as anomalous due to religiously based voting. He believed that ethnic voting based on foreign policy issues had skewed the expected voting patterns in the 1916 and 1940 elections. Furthermore, he recognized that significant third-party movements may distort the normal two-party vote distribution.(12) In examining the Roosevelt years, Bean attributed Democratic gains after 1929 almost wholly to the Great Depression and 1938 GOP advances largely to the, 1937 recession. Unlike some observers, however, he did not argue that the 1938 Republican surge would lead to a 1940 presidential victory. Likewise, Bean confidently affirmed that the Democratic sag in the 1942 election by no means presaged a Republican presidential victory in 1944, attributing the 1942 anomaly largely to low turnout.(13) The discrepancies between the off-year voting patterns of 1938 and 1942 and the presidential year voting patterns of 1940 and 1944 caused Bean to elaborate his theory of political tides and later provided him with insight into the elections of 1946 and 1948. Essentially, he now held that election tides were two-tiered and that congressional patterns in nonpresidential years ran on a level different from those in presidential years. Hence, a sharp rise in the vote of the party out of the White House in off-year elections did not necessarily forecast a coming presidential victory. Off-year elections typically generated less interest and were geared more to local affairs. Congressional elections in presidential years brought a larger turnout generally conducive to greater success for the party already in the White House.(14) 6 This concept provided a basis for Bean's analysis of the 1946 congressional election--a prelude to his expectations for 1948. The GOP gained a stunning victory in 1946, giving the Republicans control of Congress for the first time since the onset of the Great Depression. But to Bean, along with the lessened turnout of an off-year election, the 1946 result was in good measure due to "ephemeral" concerns, notably reconversion problems such as rising prices and food shortages, especially in urban areas. The voters were thus responding to short-run grievances and were not shifting fundamentally.(15) Bean did believe that 1946 marked the decline of the New Deal tide, capping as it did earlier Democratic reductions in strength in the elections of 1938 and 1942. But what did it presage? Bean rejected the notion that it necessarily initiated a new Republican tide. Given what Bean saw as the overall secular Democratic trend, it could also easily mark a Democratic low point on the way to a Democratic resurgence. The election clearly did not signify any substantial shift of voters from a Democratic to a Republican allegiance, nor was it a repudiation by voters of New Deal policies or an endorsement of GOP counterproposals. To think it a mandate to attack the New Deal, Bean admonished, could well bring a voter backlash against the Republicans.(16) 7 Bean's legend as the prophet who foretold Truman's upset 1948 victory was based upon his book, How to Predict Elections, published earlier that year. In that book Bean suggested the likelihood of a Democratic victory in 1948. The tide, he wrote, had turned against the Republican Congress in 1947. Polls showed greater favorability for both the president and the Democratic Party. Farmers were worried about their prospects. Labor resented passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. Average citizens were now more likely to blame Congress than the president for their price woes. Special 1947 elections demonstrated renewed Democratic strength. Further, a higher voter turnout could be expected than the subnormal vote of the 1944 wartime presidential election. If an election for president had been held at the end of 1947, Bean wrote, the Democratic nominee would have won and the Democrats would have made gains in the House of Representatives as well. Thus, the GOP triumph of 1946 might well prove short-lived, and a new Democratic tide might be launched.(17) At the same time, Bean set forth more pessimistic possibilities, reflecting the events of early 1948: the new Progressive Party led by Henry A. Wallace would likely draw northern votes from the Democrats, and there was uncertainty in the South in the wake of the president's pro-civil rights pronouncements. Hence Bean also wrote of the Democratic "nosedive" of early 1948, of the "abrupt reversal" of fortunes threatening "to evaporate" the prospects of a new Democratic tide. With "the political pot" boiling "with a vigor unlike that of 1944, 1940, or 1936," Bean concluded, the wise analyst had to proceed with caution; historical patterns and present polls had to be treated gingerly while awaiting the post-convention campaigns.(18) Much the same pattern of initial optimism and subsequent pessimism regarding Democratic prospects is evident in Bean's political memoranda of 1947 and 1948 to the secretary of agriculture and in other correspondence. Reflecting over a year of observation and thought, they evidence a similar but more detailed range of speculation than in How to Predict Elections, and they reveal Bean's expectations for 1948 with greater precision. In the second half of 1947, Bean noted the upsurge in Truman's poll ratings among farmers and workers and the overall revival of the Democratic Party since the debacle of 1946. Recent polls, he wrote in July, were "quite striking," and showed "the strength of the Democratic Party back to where it was in 1944 and 1940."(19) In December he added that the "peculiar political conditions" of 1946 had disappeared, and voters who had responded to the GOP slogan "had enough?" had themselves "now had enough" of the Republican Congress. "The general political temper of the country is between 55 and 56 per cent Democratic as of December 1947" he wrote. "This is the same as ... in the Spring of 1940."(20) Gloom followed shortly thereafter, however. Due partly to Progressive Party inroads on Democratic strength, both Truman's and the party's prospects for 1948 were on the wane.(21) The president's approval rating, Bean noted in April, had "fallen sharply" and was "not much above what it was in the fall of 1946. At that time the actual two-party vote was ... about 46 per cent Democratic, just as the polls suggest as of today."(22) To reverse such trends, Bean wrote in June, "would seem to require the work of a miracle-man."(23) Bean's memoranda and correspondence in the summer and fall of 1948 reflect the tensions of the campaign and the conflict between Bean's belief that his earlier prognosis had been correct and the polls and the current wisdom assuming a Republican victory were wrong, and his fear that so total a collective error was surely not conceivable. In July, for example, Bean discussed an Iowa poll showing the farm vote virtually even between Truman and Dewey. This was slightly better for the Democrat than Roosevelt's vote in 1944, but Bean downplayed the poll's significance by suggesting that the farm vote was more Democratic than was the state vote as a whole.(24) In a second July memo, Bean noted a national Gallup poll in which 52 percent of respondents favored the Democrats in dealing with pressing problems compared with 40 percent in a 1946 survey and 55 percent in 1944. But, he added, the Progressive Party in the North and dissidents in the South were primed to cut into the Democratic vote, and thus several minor miracles were still needed--"or one major one."(25) 8 In early August, based upon a Gallup survey, Bean speculated that in the two-party race since April the president had "held his own or ... picked up a little." Progressive Party support seemed in decline. However, Bean added, this did not "take into account ... adverse fourth party developments," that is, Dixiecrat inroads in the South.(26) In a second August memo, based upon Gallup polling of presidential and congressional choices, Bean foresaw the possibility of a Republican president and a Democratic House of Representatives.(27) In September, basing his discussion on Gallup surveys, Bean noted that there appeared to be a recent "upward Truman trend," with "Dewey ... no stronger today in New York and in the Middle West than he was in 1944." Various state polls were running several points higher for Truman than expected, and California showed a six-point Democratic advance. Gallup's figures, Bean believed, were substantially correct and "consistent" with his own idea of "basic relationships" discerned in historical patterns. Furthermore, there was reason to believe that undecided voters would break toward Truman. Truman would do "even better than the present Gallup showing," he concluded. Still, there remained "a long way to go" to reach a Democratic electoral majority, especially given the need "to offset third and fourth party damage."(28) In an October letter Bean cited a Gallup poll of New Mexico voters giving Truman a nine-point lead over Dewey, adding that for two decades the Democratic vote in New Mexico had "been fairly close to ... the national average." But, he concluded more pessimistically, the New Mexico figures appeared only to show "that the Democrats in New Mexico are holding out against the general downward trend."(29) In a memo discussing October state-by-state Gallup results, Bean observed more positively that a number of northeastern states, as well as California, appeared stronger for the Democrats than expected, reflecting patterns not unlike those of 1940 and 1944, and that Democratic strength was greater than in 1944 in some Midwest and Northwest states.(30) In a letter of 29 October--just days before the election--Bean quite explicitly stated his ambivalence and his ultimate expectations. He allowed that during the campaign he had speculated as to whether pollster Elmo Roper, who predicted a Dewey victory, might "not have been too hasty in assuming that the public had made up its mind with regard to the ... candidates right after the conventions, and only a miracle could shake them loose." He recalled that there had been "a good deal of shifting in public opinion in 1940," and he wondered "if the same sort of thing might not happen this year in view of the unusual campaign which Mr. Truman has put on." Nonetheless, he concluded, he was "inclined to think that the poll experts will turn out to be right ... that this campaign will bring about relatively little change in attitudes and that voters will behave on election day about as they said they would some weeks or months back."(31) Thus, in the end, however hesitatingly, Bean accepted the polls that consistently showed Dewey solidly ahead nationally as they overrode his hopes and his own earlier analyses and projections. As Bean put it in a letter shortly after the election, he took the Gallup polls projecting a Dewey win "quite seriously and was to a large extent swayed by them just before the election, both in my feelings and in some of my expectations."(32) 9 Bean, of course, was a partisan as well as an analyst; since the Roosevelt era, his appraisals of political trends had been passed on to White House and party strategists.(33) His correspondence and memoranda of 1947 and 1948 similarly contained suggestions for the campaign. Most notably, Bean called for efforts to increase voter turnout on the ground that most stay-at-homes would vote Democratic. He urged a "very extensive dramatization" of economic issues to appeal to farmers, workers, and consumers, hoping that such efforts could yet result in a "1948 political miracle."(34) When that political miracle materialized, the Bean legend was born. Life magazine hailed Bean as the "Lone Prophet" of Truman's victory.(35) He was proclaimed a "statistical wizard" and "the best-known prophet since Daniel."(36) Academic political scientists were advised to study and learn from his work.(37) Alfred A. Knopf, which published Bean's How to Predict Elections, began an advertising campaign with "Oh Mr. Gallup! Oh Mr. Roper! Obviously you don't know Bean's HOW TO PREDICT ELECTIONS."(38) Similarly, a circular for a Bean talk contrasted the pollsters with the prophet: "What slowed Dr. Gallup down to a walk? Who crossed up Mr. Crossley? Was Roper roped in?"(39) Bean himself modestly--and rather accurately-responded to letters of congratulations by observing that his judgments had been rendered valid essentially through the fortuity of "political accidents."(40) From the beginning, to be sure, there were also debunkers of the Bean legend. Shortly before the election, Bean had stated publicly that to win Truman would need a larger turnout than that which subsequently occurred.(41) Thus New York Times columnist Arthur Krock, for example, held that Bean's right "guess" was based on a "false ... premise" as to turnout, belying the "celebrated" Bean's claim to "a permanent reputation as a political prophet."(42) Bean responded that voter turnout was only one of the factors in his forecast of a Truman victory; once the campaign was underway he had relied upon polls to update what he had gleaned from the historical record, and erroneous inferences had been drawn from his efforts to "relate" late polls to that record.(43) Bean did not join in the bashing of pollsters and polls that occurred in the wake of the election. Rather, he defended polls as relatively reliable samplers of public opinion that supplemented analysis of the historical record. The mythical "Bean Poll," as he called it, was always in that sense augmented by Gallup and others. He noted, however, that in the 1948 election there had been a late swing in public opinion to Truman that polls--not taken toward the end of the campaign--had failed to pick up.(44) 10 In How to Predict Elections, Bean placed the 1948 election within his cyclical schema. In analyses before the election, he judged 1946 as the high point of Republican fortunes, coming as it did in the wake of GOP gains in the off-year elections of 1938 and 1942. In this sense, 1946 marked the decline of the New Deal tide and the culmination, not the beginning, of a Republican upsurge. Bean suggested that 1947 and 1948 might witness the onset not of a conservative cycle, as Arthur Schlesinger had forecast, but a new cycle of Democratic and reform ascendancy through the 1950s based on public support for economic security and stability.(45) In The Mid-Term Battle, published in 1950, Bean attributed the Democratic sweep of 1948 to a farmer swing--"a green uprising"--for Truman and to Democratic congressional gains in urban, industrial labor areas. A larger voter turnout would have meant a larger Democratic victory. Based on 1948, Bean predicted the beginning of what he labeled the Fair Deal tide, pushing Democratic and reform advances forward into the coming decade.(46) Thus, Bean concluded, in language suggestive of V. O. Key Jr's later "critical elections" concept, the 1948 Democratic victory "was no ordinary one," but "resembled a tidal movement like the initial change in political direction in 1930." It appeared to mark "the beginning of a new long-time swing of the political pendulum" in the Democratic direction.(47) As he saw it in March 1950, 1948 constituted "the first stage in the Fair Deal Tide, just as 1930 was the first of the New Deal Tide."(48) The early 1950s, however, sorely tested Bean as a premier political analyst. In previewing the 1950 congressional races, Bean placed the off-year election within the context of an overall Democratic trend, but he also realized that newer issues such as alleged communism in government and the impact of the Korean War in distracting attention from standard political issues could rebound to the Republicans' benefit.(49) He admitted that he was at a loss as to how to factor in the impact of the Korean conflict on the elections, writing that he had not "the slightest idea of how to work out a quantitative balance" on such a matter.(50) 11 In 1952, Bean's challenge was to assess the inroads of these issues against the strength of the Democrats as the party of economic security. It would take, he held, an unusual confluence of events to dislodge an incumbent party during economic good times. While the Republican candidate, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, began with a decided edge because of his personal fame, Bean discerned a shift toward Democratic nominee Adlai E. Stevenson over the course of the campaign.(51) If his analysis proved as prophetic as in 1948, he wrote, the shift should continue and result in Stevenson's election.(52) This would be consistent with "the previous ... elections where pre-convention statistical clues, regardless of candidates, turned out to be correct."(53) Perhaps sensing a reprise of the previous presidential contest, Bean declared that "political analysts" were now "caught in practically the same situation ... as ... in 1948." The polls gave Eisenhower a wide lead, but the actual voting records did "not indicate the Republican trend ... implied in the current polls."(54) The Eisenhower landslide of 1952, of course, proved no reprise of 1948, and Bean, despite his stress on economic factors and reliance on the statistical record, was not surprised. The potential inroads of the newer issues on Democratic strength had weighed heavily on his mind. Such issues, he agreed, tended to work against the Democrats much as a depression worked against the incumbent party.(55) Most importantly, he acknowledged that he saw no way "to give quantitative expression to the new elements in this year's political picture, such as ... hero worship, and communism, along with the Korean situation."(56) History provided no "guide to this year."(57) Because Bean had declined to make a public prediction of the 1952 outcome, acknowledging that his statistical method could not encompass the newer ingredients, he preserved his reputation as the prophet of 1948. In retrospect, he emphasized Eisenhower's personal popularity as a deus ex machina that overwhelmed the Democrats' normal secular advantage.(58) Bean perceived this development as an anomaly, one allowed for by his approach (and akin to the notion of a "deviating election" later developed by academic political analysts).(59) But 1952 also suggested fundamental limits to Bean's analysis. Essentially, Bean's frame of reference was shaped by the Great Depression/New Deal era with its emphasis on economic issues. This focus worked brilliantly for Bean in 1948 when Truman parlayed memories of the thirties into his upset victory. But Bean's parameters fell short when the issues changed from those of the 1930s and of 1948 to those of 1952. 12 Nonetheless, Bean, his reputation intact from his 1948 success, continued to issue publications and make public pronouncements on elections for the next two decades. He held that the Republican "swell" of the early 1950s was "low-powered" and a temporary "deviation" from a Democratic surge again evident in the late 1950s and early 1960s. He attributed Republican Richard Nixon's victory in 1968 to ephemeral factors, and despite Republican inroads in the South he continued to see a decades-old secular Democratic trend.(60) In his last book, How to Predict the 1972 Election, Bean professed less confidence in the concept of political tides or cycles and gave greater play to the impact of more immediate events on election outcomes. "Sometimes," he wrote of his statistical analysis of political patterns, "this works. Now and then it doesn't, as my experience in 1952 teaches"(61) The 1972 election proved to be another case in point, as the anomalous Democratic nomination of strongly anti-war George McGovern over the conventionally liberal Edmund Muskie showed. 13 When Louis Bean died in 1994, the New York Times obituary headline predictably, and correctly, described him as an "Analyst Best Known For 1948 Prediction."(62) But the prophet was also a pioneer analyst of voting behavior. Harold F. Gosnell, himself an academic progenitor of that field, called in 1933 for "statistical studies" that would illuminate "the amplitude and rhythm of political cycles."(63) Bean proceeded shortly thereafter to undertake essentially what Gosnell had called for. In that sense, Bean was a gifted amateur, that is, a nonacademic analyst capable of providing fresh insights on a subject of central interest to academics. Bean's cyclical approach was widely paralleled in the 1940s. Arthur Schlesinger Sr. developed a similar concept, and he and Bean vied over whose was more accurate. Harold Gosnell proffered a cyclical notion explicitly related to Bean's. V. O. Key Jr. advanced a comparable cyclical analysis in 1946, but by 1952 Key had embraced a predominantly secular view of political change, placing cyclical oscillations within the context of long-term political transformation.(64) Similarly, in his appraisal of Truman's 1948 victory, Samuel Lubell also placed his analysis in a secular context, explicitly rejecting cyclical theory. He wrote that in 1948 the expectation of a "GOP pendulum" swing had reflected a belief in "the normally Republican majority" dating to the Civil War. Now, however, erstwhile minorities had become "the new majority."(65) To be sure, Bean's analysis also had secular elements. Bean placed politics in time instead of viewing each election as a discrete event. Most notably, he posited a rising Democratic trend dating back decades and underlying swings of the cycle. But Bean's emphasis on secular trends remained in the background. For Bean, the secular remained subordinate to his cyclical pattern of analysis. After 1948, secular theories of political analysis gained ascendancy, making Bean's cyclical concept appear outdated. Thus while the 1948 election signaled Bean's rise to prominence, it also marked the height of his influence. x x x (1) Current Biography 1948, A. N. Rothe, ed., s.v. "Bean, Louis H.,"
38-39; Unofficial Observer [John Franklin Carter], The New Dealers (New
York, 1934), 93; "The Reminiscences of Louis H. Bean," Oral History
Research Office of Columbia University (microfiche copy at the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.), 5, 22, 27-28, 30-31, 34-37, 39. |
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Профессор Теодор Розеноф (Theodore Rosenof)
в 1965 году закончил Rutgers University и в 1970 году получил Ph.D. в
University of Wisconsin. Многие годы он преподает историю и экономику в
Mercy College в New York. Область его научных интересов – экономические
проблемы «нового курса» президента